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seem to be harmed by a six-year statute of limitations in determining
municipal liability.

ADVERTISING-FALSE IMPRESSION HELD ACTIONABLE.-Defendant corporation had advertised toys for sale at large discounts.
Nevertheless it sold two games at a "discounted" price greater than
the standard retail rate established in the community. In affirming
a conviction for deceptive advertising,' the Court of Appeals held
that though the defendant might set its list prices and discounts
freely, it might not create the false impression that it was underselling
its competitors. People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d
180, 175 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1958).
At common law the merchant's practice of making exalted claims
for his wares was not actionable if the parties dealt at arm's length. 2
But when the expansion of business gave rise to mass advertising,
exaggeration to the point of falsehood became so common that some
regulation was badly needed. The only existing remedy made successful prosecution all but impossible because it entailed proving all
three requirements of a deceit action, i.e., intentional falsification,
reliance, and resulting harm.3 In 1911 the trade magazine Printer's
Ink proposed a Model Statute 4 designed to curb advertising abuses.
This statute did not require knowledge of falsity, intent to deceive,
or damage to a purchaser, but rather imposed absolute liability on
anyone guilty of the prohibited act.5 At present only five states have
not adopted this Model Statute in a general
way; 6 eleven have added
7
the requirement of knowledge of falsity.
for filing a petition in an article 78 proceeding in certiorari or mandamus),
with N.Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT §48(1) (which allows a six-year period for the
commencement of a contract action).
1 "Any . . . corporation . . . [which], with [the] intent to sell or in any
wise dispose of merchandise . . .. directly or indirectly, to the public ....
makes, publishes, . . . or places before the public . . . in the form of a . . .
poster, bill, sign, placard, card . . . an advertisement [which] . . . contains any
assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or
misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PEN. LAW § 421 (Supp.

1958).

2 See,

e.g., Burwash v. Ballou, 230 Ill. 34, 82 N.E. 355 (1907).
3 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 525, at 59 (1938).
4 See Comment, 36 YALE L.J. 1155, 1156 n.6 (1927).
5
Id. at 1157.
6 Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Mississippi, and New Mexico. See
56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018, 1058 (1956).
7 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17500 (West 1956); FLA. STAT.
§ 817.06 (1941); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 195 (1957); MAss. ANN.
c. 266, §91 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 580:9 (1955); PA. STAT.

Note,
ANN.

LAws
ANN.
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Though New York has had some form of deceptive-advertising
statute on its books since 1904,8 the law was of little effect because
for conviction it required proof that the advertiser had been aware
of the falsity of his statements. 9 When New York adopted the Model
Statute in its complete form in 1921 10 (retained substantially unchanged as section 421 of the Penal Law), it took its first step in
the direction of effective advertising control. But since section 421
is a penal statute, it was questioned whether the section should be
interpreted strictly in favor of the defendant" even though such an
interpretation would greatly hamper its regulatory power. This query
has been answered in the negative both by the courts 12 and by the
provisions of the Penal Law itself. 13 In People v. Glubo 14 the court,
while affirming a conviction for misleading radio commercials under
section 421, said:
It should be noted ... that the rule of strict construction is not applicable
here. The Legislature has expressly abrogated that rule with respect to all

the provisions of the Penal Law.' 5

That section 421 has not been construed strictly in favor of the defendant has been made clear by convictions under it in the absence
of intention to 8deceive, 1' knowledge of falsity,17 or actual deception
of a purchaser.'
In the past, the New York courts were reluctant to convict
solely on the ground of false impression when the words of the advertisement did not actually constitute a false statement. In People
v. Le Winter's Radio Stores, Inc.,'9 conviction was refused though a
storekeeper had placed a sign on a refrigerator quoting an incorrectly
tit. 18, § 4857 (1945); S.D. CODE § 13.1831 (Supp. 1952); TENN.
§ 39-1910 (Supp. 1958) ; TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1554 (1953) ;
ANN. §76-4-1 (1953); VT. STAT. §8324 (1947).

CODE ANN.
UTAH CODE

8Laws of N.Y. 1904, c. 423.

9 "Any . . . corporation . . . [which] knowingly makes or disseminates

any statement or assertion of fact . . . which is untrue or calculated to mislead, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
10 Laws of N.Y. 1921, c. 520.
11 That this attitude persists, see People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320,
324, 151 N.E.2d 180, 183, 175 N.Y.S.2d 16, 20 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
12 Accord, People v. Reilly, 255 App. Div. 109, 6 N.Y.S.2d 161 (4th Dep't

1938), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 509, 19 N.E.2d 919 (1939).

See People v. Glubo,

5 A.D.2d 527, 540, 174 N.Y.S.2d 159, 170 (2d Dep't 1958) (dictum).
'3 "The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply
to this chapter or any of the provisions thereof, but all such provisions must
be construed according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice

and effect the objects of the law." N.Y.

PEN. LAW

§ 21.

5 A.D.2d 527, 174 N.Y.S.2d 159 (2d Dep't 1958).
is Id. at 540, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
16 People v. Garten, 235 App. Div. 641, 255 N.Y. Supp. 823 (2d Dep't 1932)
14

(mem. opinion).
17 People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943).
's People v. Kelly, 204 Misc. 145, 122 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Magis. Ct. 1953).
19 256 App. Div. 1098, 11 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1939) (mem. opinion).
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low price, because in small print the word "from" preceded the
amount, indicating that the sign did not necessarily refer to that particular appliance. 20 However, in the principal case, conviction was
allowed for false impression alone when the defendant placed this
sign in its window:
Westchester First
Toy Discount
Super Market
20% to 40% Off
Although the sign did not claim that every item in the store was included in the discount, 21 and the games purchased by the complainant
might have been distinguished from the toys mentioned in the advertisement as being sold at a discount, the majority held that a generally false impression had been created.
With this approach, New York is following the lead of the
federal courts.

In FTC v. National Health Aids, Inc., 22 the court

stated that the test of the falsity of an advertisement is the net impression likely to be made on the general public.2 3 The decision in
the Minjac case also ties in with the policy shown toward the related
problem of "bait" advertising. This is the practice of offering a discount on a brand-name product solely as a lure without intending to
sell the lead item. In doubt as to whether section 421 could be
stretched to cover such situations, the legislature has this year passed
an amendment to the General Business Law 24 empowering the

Attorney General to obtain injunctive relief against violators. The
injunction
can issue without proof that anyone has in fact been
25
misled.

It is suggested that the New York trend in advertising regulation is indicative of a strong approach to the problem. Without the
likelihood of successful conviction, few regulatory agencies or indi20

See Trial Record, People v. Le Winter's Radio Stores, Inc. (Ct. Spec.

Sess.), as quoted in People v. Glubo, 5 A.D.2d 527, 539, 174 N.Y.S.2d 159,
169-70 (2d Dep't 1958). But see People v. Kelly, supra note 18. A racingform publisher had printed winners on his tip-sheet after the races had been
run and then left the selections around the track at the end of the day as an
inducement to purchase the form in the future. He was convicted of false
advertising under § 421 even though he had not made a false statement,
apparently on the strength of the deliberate fraud involved.
21 People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 325, 151 N.E.2d 180, 183, 175
N.Y.S.2d 16, 20 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
22 108 F. Supgi. 340 (D. Md. 1952).
23 The federal statute reads:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false
advertisement(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the purpose
of inducing . . . directly or indirectly the purchase of food, drugs, devices,
or cosmetics ... ." 52 STAT. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §52 (1952).
24 N.Y. GErN. Bus. LAw § 396 (Supp. 1958).
25 Ibid. See 140 N.Y.L.J. No. 55, p. 1, col. 5, 6 (Sept. 17, 1958).
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vidual citizens would instigate prosecution. However, it should also
be noted that the false-impression doctrine is broad enough to include
a very large percentage of current discount-offering ads. Since widespread prosecution seems impractical, the force of the doctrine will
probably be applied in a few isolated cases as a deterrent to other
violators.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-LEx Loci DELICTI HELD APPLICABLE AS
TO AVAILABILITY OF DEFENSE OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY, REGARD-

LESS OF LAW OF PLACE WHERE CHARITY ORGANIzD.-Plaintiff

brought this action for the wrongful death of his fifteen-year-old
daughter. Decedent fell to her death while on a tour in Oregon conducted by defendant, a charitable organization incorporated under the
laws of New York. One of the affirmative defenses ' pleaded by defendant was that of charitable immunity from tort liability, under the
decisional law of Oregon. The lower court granted a motion to
strike the defense. 2 The Appellate Division modified 3 the ruling by
upholding the validity of this defense, holding that the lex loci delicti
controls as to the availability of the defense of charitable immunity
and not the law of the state where the charity was organized. Kaufman
v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 6 A.D.2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587,
motion for leave to appeal granted, 6 A.D.2d 1016, 178 N.Y.S.2d
623 (2d Dep't 1958).
In general, the law of the place where a tort was committed is
controlling, 4 not only as to whether a cause of action arose ab initio,"5
but also as to the availability of defenses,6 e.g., charitable immunity.
There is, however, an exception to this rule. Where a strong public
policy of the place of the forum is in direct conflict with the law of
the place of commission of the tort, that public policy must prevail. 7
I Another defense, involving a covenant not to sue, was set up in the answer,
but is not treated here.
2Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 174 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct.
1957)
3The ruling of the Supreme Court as to the defense of charitable immunity was reversed; as to the covenant not to sue, affirmed.
4 Accord, Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 248,
194 N.E. 692, 694 (1935).
See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS § 166,

comment b, § 377 (1934) ;
1949).

GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 95, at 267 (3d ed.

GSee Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 226, 186 N.E.
679, 682 (1933).
6 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 188-89 (2d ed. 1951). Cf. Fitzpatrick v.
International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929).
7Jewtraw v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 153, 112
N.Y.S.2d 727, 731 (1952) ; Allison v. Mennonite Publications Bd., 123 F. Supp.

